We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two "lobbyists" compete for the votes of legislators by o¤ering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists'budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. JEL classi…cation numbers: P16, C72
Introduction
Consider a legislature that will vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbyists compete by bidding for legislators'votes. We study how the legislative outcome depends on the lobbyists'budgets and preferences and the legislators'preferences. We show that the outcome generally fails to fully re ‡ect legislators'preferences. Moreover, we …nd that lobbyists'budget constraints can change the outcome in interesting and signi…cant ways from situations where lobbyists'budgets exceed their maximal willingness to pay.
We model the lobbying process via a complete-information game in which lobbyists alternate in increasing their o¤ers to legislators. Legislators care about how they cast their vote, and any payments they receive from lobbyists, rather than about the eventual outcome. The idea is that legislators care about how their voting record is perceived by their constituency, regardless of the actual outcome.
1 Naturally the di¤erence in the budgets of the lobbyists plays a critical role in determining which lobbyist is successful when lobbyists are budget constrained, and the di¤erence in their maximal willingness to pay plays an important role when they are not budget constrained. However, legislators'voting preferences enter into the determination of the winner in subtle ways, and are markedly di¤erent in how they matter depending on whether or not lobbyists are budget constrained.
The main analytical result (Proposition 2 in section 3.1) concerns the case where lobbyists are budget constrained. There we show that a lobbyist wins if her budget plus half of the total value that legislators attach to voting in her favor exceeds the corresponding magnitude for the other lobbyist. The result that preferences are weighed half as much as budgets in determining the outcome stems from the strategic aspects of the vote-buying game. In making a bid for any given legislator's vote, the lobbyist cares not only about how much he or she must promise to pay, but also about how much this o¤er will free up for the other lobbyist to use in bidding for other votes.
In contrast, when budgets are unbounded, the role of legislator preferences is very di¤erent. What matters then are the lobbyists'valuations and the intensity of preferences 1 The extent to which legislators care about outcomes would matter only when they are pivotal.
However, as discussed in section 2.1, the probability of being pivotal is often negligible, especially in the context of vote buying where the lobbyist can intentionally make the legislators non-pivotal by buying slightly more than the minimal number of votes they need (see Dal-Bo (2001) ). This would render the legislators' preferences over outcomes unimportant and they would thus be willing to tender their vote to the highest bidder. In contrast, the extent to which legislator cares about how the vote is cast signi…cantly a¤ects the outcome (both payments and who wins). of a particular "near-median" group of legislators. The lobbyist with a-priori minority support wins when its valuation exceeds the other lobbyist's valuation by more than a magnitude that depends on the preferences of that near-median group (Proposition 3).
Thus, the voting preferences of the legislators have quite di¤erent e¤ects in the two scenarios. When budget constraints are important, the intensity of the preferences of all legislators matter; when budgets do not constitute the important constraints, only the intensity of preferences of a particular near-median group of legislators matter.
The discussion in section 4 collects a number of additional issues, among them the case of unknown legislators'preferences, welfare implications and related literature. It is noted there that, in general, the outcome of the vote buying game need not be e¢ cient and might involve higher or lower total surplus than what will arise in its absence. It is also claimed that, when lobbyists'budgets are raised by a certain donation game in which all of the population participates, then the lobbyists'budgets re ‡ect the population preferences and the overall outcome is e¢ cient.
Much of the formal literature on lobbying is concerned with in ‡uencing a single decision maker (e.g., a regulator). Our works belongs to a somewhat di¤erent strand of the literature that examines the lobbying of a voting body like a legislature. In the fundamental contribution of Groseclose and Snyder (1996) the lobbyists move sequentially and each makes only one …nal o¤er. Their analysis focuses on the advantage that this asymmetric procedure confers on the second mover-the …rst mover can win only by buying a su¢ ciently signi…cant supermajority 2 . Our model essentially removes this asymmetry by allowing the lobbyists to continue responding to each other with counter-o¤ers. In some scenarios, some formal procedure may indeed create the asymmetry on which the work of Groseclose and Snyder focuses. However, in many other situations there is no such formal structure and the lobbying process resembles more a continuing bidding process like the one we model. Our analysis shows that this changes signi…cantly the strategic interaction and the results. Our paper is also related to a companion paper Wolinsky (2006), henceforth DJW (2006) , that models a general-election scenario rather than a legislative setting. The main di¤erence is that, in the lobbying setting that we examine here, legislators care about how they cast their vote, whereas in the companion paper voters care only about the outcome. This change is more natural for the scenario of lobbying in a legislative setting compared to more general elections.
3 A second di¤erence is in the focus here on the e¤ect of budget constraints, which does not appear in DJW (2006) . 4 These di¤erences in setting lead to very di¤erent conclusions regarding the structure of equilibria. Finally, the vote-buying model itself di¤ers: in DJW (2006) we consider a uniform-o¤er model where the vote buyers cannot make di¤erent o¤ers to di¤erent voters.
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A Model of Vote Buying
Prior to an election two lobbyists, X and Y , try to in ‡uence the voting of a legislature with an odd number, N , of legislators by directly buying votes of legislators. To simplify matters, we assume that vote buying is an ordinary transaction: the lobbyist gets full control of the vote in exchange for an up-front payment to the legislator 6 .
The Lobbying Game
The lobbyists alternate in making o¤ers. Lobbyist k in its turn announces an up-front o¤er p k i 0 to each legislator i for her vote. A fresh o¤er (or promise) made to a legislator cannot be lower than those previously made by the same lobbyist to the same legislator. There is a small additional cost, > 0, incurred each round in which a lobbyist makes an o¤er.
There is an odd number N of legislators. The utility that legislator i gets from selling to Party k at the price p 
of course, suggested by the fact that people vote despite it being costly and their pivot probability being negligible. To the extent that the voting preference are more important than preferences over outcomes, the present paper provides a more relevant model for general elections. The other paper pertains to cases where voters care predominantly about outcomes. 4 Budget constraints do not have the same impact in settings where voters care only about outcomes, and so their role is only interesting in this paper. 5 In situations where voting preferences do not matter, targeting speci…c voters is less consequential.
In the legislative application, lobbyists have strong incentives to target certain legislators. 6 In Section 4.5 below we also consider the possibility of o¤ering indirect promises to voters that are only contingent on the outcome.
To simplify the discussion, we will assume from now on that the legislators play their dominant strategy. Thus, given the outstanding o¤ers at any stage, for each legislator there is a unique lobbyist to whom that legislator would tender her vote if the process were to stop at that stage. Let I k t denote the set of legislators who would tender to lobbyist k = X; Y if the process were to stop at the beginning of period t.
The bidding ends at the beginning of period t with a win by k if both I k t > I j t and I k t 1 > I j t 1 , i.e., if j passed up an opportunity to outbid k. Once the bidding process ends, legislators simultaneously tender their votes to the lobbyists. The lobbyist who collects more than half the votes wins.
The lobbyists …nance their payments out of budgets denoted B X and B Y . The total payments that lobbyist k would have to pay at any stage of the game, assuming that the game were to end at that stage, cannot exceed B k . That is, at the beginning of every period t it has to be that P
is the number of periods in which k has made an o¤er up to the beginning of t. It is important that at each stage the budget constraint has to hold only with respect to those obligations that are still relevant at that stage. If lobbyist k's up-front o¤er p k i has been outbid by the other lobbyist, so that at that point legislator i would sell her vote to the other lobbyist, then lobbyist k does not have to count this up-front o¤er against its budget.
Each lobbyist has a value W k for winning. If the game ends in period t < 1 then
The payo¤ is 1 if the game never ends. Assuming that the legislators always follow their dominant strategy, the game we analyze is between the lobbyists. This is a game of perfect information. The lobbyists' budgets and valuations and the legislators'preferences are commonly known to the lobbyists. When a lobbyist makes o¤ers, he or she observes the past o¤ers and promises received by each legislator.
The lobbyists' strategies are de…ned in the obvious way-they specify how much more is o¤ered to each legislator over past o¤ers, contingent on the history of o¤ers. The solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium.
The focus is on the legislators' voting preferences rather than on their preferences over outcomes, since it is natural to assume that for re-election considerations legislators care a great deal about how they vote regardless of what the actual outcome is.
7 It is 7 The related lobbying literature (Grosclose and Snyder (1996) and Banks (2000)) also assumes voting natural to think of the V k i 's as being related to the preferences of i's constituency over the actual outcome. We will indeed make this connection later when discussing e¢ ciency in Section 4.3.
Notice that, even if legislators have direct preferences over the outcomes, those would probably be of secondary importance as they would matter only when the legislator's vote is pivotal which might occur only with low probability. Furthermore, in a vote buying scenario, pivot considerations are even less prominent than in other scenarios, as the vote buyers can e¤ectively eliminate them by o¤ering to buy slightly more than the minimal number of votes they need (see Dal-Bo (2001) for a discussion of this issue).
Further Assumptions and Notation
The analysis that follows depends on the V k i 's only through V i and we will therefore represent the preferences in terms of V i . We order the i's so that V i is nonincreasing and let m be the median legislator (m = (N + 1)=2). Without loss of generality we assume V m > 0, so that the median prefers to vote for X. Therefore without any vote-buying X would prevail. Let n = arg max fi : V i > 0g, i.e., n has the weakest preference for X over Y from among all those who prefer X over Y .
There is a smallest money unit " > 0. Both the o¤ers and the budgets are whole multiples of ". To avoid dealing with ties, which add nothing of interest to the analysis, we assume that the V i 's and W k 's are not whole multiples of ".
Given a number z, let dze " denote the minimal multiple of " greater than z, and bzc " the maximal multiple of " smaller than z. Assuming as above that each legislator votes for X (respectively Y ) if and only if V i plus the amount of money that legislator receives for that vote is strictly positive (respectively negative), then Y must spend at least V = P n i=m dV i e " to obtain a majority. We assume that both B Y and W Y are greater than V as otherwise the solution is trivial. In Figure 1 the solid line is dV i e " , the line crosses the axis at n, the long vertical segment is at m, and the marked (red) area is V . The vote-buying game is a sort of a multi-unit auction with a special form of complementarity (only a bundle of more than half the units is valuable). It resembles an all-pay auction in that the loser may end up paying for some votes. But it is not a pure all-pay auction, since at most one lobbyist ends up paying for any given vote. If there were only one legislator, then this would be a complete-information English auction (that allows jump-bidding). We start with the following observation that applies to both constrained and unconstrained bidders.
Proposition 1 The vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every equilibrium the same lobbyist wins, and the losing lobbyist never makes any o¤ers.
The existence of a unique winner when budgets are binding follows because this is a …nite game of perfect information and ties are ruled out by assumption. In the unconstrained game, since o¤ers are nondecreasing, they eventually reach a point where they must be greater than the value. While it is possible in principle that the bidder at that point expects to be outbid by the opponent and hence does not expect to pay that full amount, the …xed cost of making an o¤er ( > 0) implies that such an o¤er will never be made. Thus the game is equivalent to a …nite truncated version, and hence has a unique outcome. That the loser never makes o¤ers also follows from the positive bidding cost .
Budget-constrained lobbyists
In this part the budgets are the relevant constraints on the lobbyists. That is, W k > B k for k = X; Y , and so each lobbyist is willing to spend up to the budget in order to win. The winner is determined by a combination of the relative strengths in terms of the budgets and the intensity of the of the legislators'voting preferences. Roughly speaking,
, exceeds a measure of the preference advantage of X measured by one half of the total utility advantage of X over Y , i.e.,
To understand why the utilities of all legislators matter, but only count half as much as the size of the budgets, it is useful to understand the structure of the winning strategies. The following example helps developing the intuition for this problem by pointing out that the natural least expensive majority, LEM, strategy, which secures the least expensive minimal majority at each stage, may not be optimal.
Example 1 Optimal versus Naive Strategies -Why Utility has a Shadow Price of 1/2.
There are three legislators with V 1 = V 2 = 0:5 and V 3 = 30:5. The grid size is " = 1. Budgets are B X = 100 and B Y = 80.
Note that B
X B Y = 20 < 29:5 = P i V i , so the total utility advantage for Y is greater than the absolute budget advantage of X. Nevertheless, as we show below in Proposition 2, X should win, because X's budget exceeds Y 's budget plus half of the total utility di¤erence. That is, basically what matters is the budget advantage relative to one half the total preference advantage (setting aside small corrections that are explained in the proof of the result). Let us see how X should play to win.
Suppose that X follows the naive LEM strategy of always spending the least amount necessary to guarantee a majority at any stage. Suppose (just for the purpose of illustration) that at the …rst stage Y makes o¤ers of 55 to legislator 1 and 25 to legislator 3. The cheapest legislator for X to buy back is legislator 1 at a cost of 55. Assume Y now o¤ers 55 to legislator 2. At this point X has 45 left in her budget, and cannot a¤ord to buy back either legislator 2 or 3.
What was wrong with this strategy? The problem is that, while X bought the cheapest legislator in response to Y 's o¤er, X also freed up a large amount of Y 's budget for Y to spend elsewhere, while X's budget was committed. X needs to worry not only about what X is spending at any given stage, but also about how much of Y 's budget is freed up. E¤ectively, freeing up a unit of Y 's budget is "just"as bad for X as spending an extra unit of X's budget.
So, instead of following the naive LEM strategy of buying the cheapest legislators, let X always follow a strategy of measuring the "shadow price"of a legislator as the amount that X must spend plus the amount of Y 's budget that is freed up. If X had followed that strategy, then in response to Y 's …rst stage o¤er above, X would have purchased legislator 3 at a price of 56. Then Y would have 25 free, and could only spend it on legislators 1 and 2. Regardless of how Y spends this budget, X can always buy legislator 2 at the next stage at a price of at most 25, against which Y has no winning response.
The example shows that keeping track of the shadow price is a good strategy. In fact, for large budgets it guarantees a win for the winning candidate characterized in Proposition 2 below. Let us see how we get from this understanding of "shadow prices" to the expressions underlying Proposition 2.
Under the strategy suggested in the above example, X keeps track of the o¤er that X has to make to buy a legislator given the current o¤er of Y , plus the amount of Y 's budget that is freed up. The amount that X has to o¤er to buy a given legislator i when Y has an o¤er of p V i =2. In the proof this translates into the "strength"of Y being Y 's budget less the sum of V i =2 over legislators that prefer Y , X's "strength"being X's budget plus the sum of V i =2 over those legislators that prefer X, and the winner being approximately the stronger lobbyist. This is captured in Proposition 2 below, which includes some slight modi…cations to account for the grid size and some other details that are covered in the formal proof. The result requires that budgets be su¢ ciently large as speci…ed next.
Proposition 2 If the budgets are large enough so that (2) and (3) are satis…ed, then, for su¢ ciently small , X wins at no cost if
and Y wins at cost V paid to the legislators m (median) through n (almost-indi¤erent) if
The interesting feature is that, very roughly, increasing a legislator's preference for a given lobbyist by $1 is equivalent, in terms of who wins, to increasing the budget of that lobbyist by $0:5. Thus money is worth much more to a lobbyist than having its bill being liked, as might be expected due to the use of funds being more ‡exible. Nevertheless, one of the implications of Proposition 2 is that a lobbyist with strong minority support can win despite having a lower budget than the opposition.
The result says that a lobbyist, say X, bene…ts from a dollar spent on buying votes twice as much as from e¤ecting a change in a legislators' preferences that increases V i (the relative preference for X) by one dollar. How might this translate into lobbyist behavior? As noted in the introduction it is natural to view legislator's preferences for voting as determined by the constituency preferences. So the result is informative about the optimal investment by lobbyists (or the interest groups whom they represent) on in ‡uencing constituent's preferences. (This can be achieved by investing in local public goods, advertising, etc.). At the optimum the marginal dollar spent on in ‡uencing constituents should translate into the equivalent of two dollars spent directly on the legislator.
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Note that if voting preferences are relatively unimportant, i.e., P i V i is negligible relative to the budgets, then the comparison boils down to a comparison of the budgets. That is, the lobbyist with the highest budget wins. When this is the case, the optimal strategy simpli…es to the strategy that seeks to obtain the least expensive majority at each point (LEM strategy), which is not optimal in general. A scenario with negligible voting preferences would arise, If legislators cared only about outcomes (and not how they vote) and the probability of being pivotal were negligible (as it would be in many plausible cases), since then the preferences over outcomes essentially do not a¤ect the vote tendering considerations of the legislators.
As the proof makes clear, in fact only one large-budget condition is needed in each case. That is, X wins if equations (2) and (4) hold, and Y wins if (3) and (5) are satis…ed. When budgets are not large enough (as given by (4) and (5)) the game becomes quite complex and the formula for determining the winner is involved. As we see little insight and great complication in such an analysis, we do not pursue it. The following example serves to show that an assumption of large enough budgets is necessary. In this example
and so if we applied the expressions from Proposition 2, we would mistakenly conclude that Y should win. If we did not assume small costs of making o¤ers (i.e., if = 0), then the characterization of the winning lobbyist would be unchanged. There could potentially be multiple equilibria which di¤er from one another with respect to the total payments made by the winner and the identities of their recipients. The loser would still make no payments in equilibrium, but by making bids that will be outbid by the winner, the loser could force the winner to spend more than the minimum sum necessary to obtain a majority in the absence of active opposition.
Unconstrained lobbyists
We now analyze the case in which the budgets are not binding. The identity of the winner depends on the relative magnitudes of the lobbyists'valuations and the intensity of the voting preferences of the legislators whose index i falls between m (median) and n (weakest supporter of X). Recall that V is the sum that Y has to commit to the m through n legislators in order to outbid X in the …rst step in the least expensive way. + V ] such that, for su¢ ciently small , in any equilibrium:
> , then Y wins at cost V paid to the legislators m (median) through n (almost-indi¤erent).
If
then X wins at no cost.
; then Y wins at cost V if it moves …rst , and X wins at positive cost if it moves …rst.
The cuto¤ level has the following meaning. Suppose that X moves …rst and commits the maximal sum that does not exceed its value, W X "
, in a manner that makes it as costly as possible for Y to obtain the majority. Then is the minimal sum that Y would have to commit to voters in order to obtain a majority. The precise characterization of in terms of the parameters of the model is provided in the proof.
The following example clari…es the role of the bidding cost . The idea is that, with = 0, there are equilibria in which the higher value lobbyist, say Y , loses since, if Y tries to win, the other lobbyist, X, can make Y pay out substantial sums without X incurring any cost itself. This is accomplished by o¤ers made by X that are later outbid by Y . 3 = 0 but for brevity here and hereafter we will often specify in each stage only the part of the outstanding o¤er that is being increased). We claim that there is an equilibrium in the ensuing subgame in which Y quits immediately, since it can win in the continuation only by paying more than 12:5. To construct such a continuation, observe that in any equilibrium continuation Y would never commit more than W Y in one step. This is because the expected incremental sum of payo¤s of X and Y from that point on would be negative which is inconsistent with any equilibrium continuation. Thus, Y responds to p auctions, though the vote buying game of the present paper is not a pure all-pay auction. That result in DJW in turn was preceded by a similar result due to Leininger(1991) 
12. The following is a SPE in the subgame following (i). X regains the majority with p Notice that, at any point along the continuations described in the example, X behaves optimally, since it expects to be relieved from any commitments that it makes by subsequent promises by Y . This is why this construction requires = 0. With positive , X would not want to continue bidding when it is certain to lose, even if its commitments would be later annulled.
Discussion
Budget Constraints
At a …rst glance one might conjecture that the only di¤erence between the scenarios with and without budget constraints is that in the constrained scenario the budgets play the same role that the valuations play in the unconstrained scenario. In some auction models this is indeed the case. However, it turns out that the outcomes of the two votebuying scenarios with and without binding budget constraints are markedly di¤erent from one another. When the budget constraints are not binding only the preferences of the legislators whose index i falls between m (median) and n (weakest supporter of X) matter for the determination of the winner. These are the legislators whom Y must buy in order to outbid X in the least expensive way. In contrast, when budget constraints are the decisive element, the preferences of all the legislators a¤ect the outcome. The weight given to the preferences that matter also di¤er across these two cases. In the case of budget-constrained lobbyists, the preferences of the legislators enter with half the weight given to the budgets of the lobbyists. In the unconstrained case the preferences of the legislators indexed m to n enter with same weight as the lobbyists'valuations.
The important di¤erence between budget constraints and valuations is that the former constitute hard constraints on the outstanding commitments while the latter can be exceeded despite it being unpro…table. In static scenarios, this distinction might not matter because bids in excess of the valuation are dominated. However, in a dynamic scenario in which past bids become sunk, the distinction between budgets and valuations might become very meaningful for behavior o¤ the equilibrium path. When the budget constraints bind, a central strategic consideration concerns how much budget is being freed up for the opponent. Therefore, the most e¤ective strategy does not necessarily minimize the payments promised to legislators at each stage and the preferences of those who are not the least expensive to acquire also enter the calculations. When the budget constraints do not bind, this consideration is irrelevant, as past o¤ers are essentially sunk costs and the most e¤ective strategy entails acquisition of the least expensive votes at each stage.
Negligible voting preferences
A special case of the results of propositions 2 and 3 is when the legislators'voting preferences are negligible. In such a case the lobbyist with the larger budget or larger value wins in the constrained and unconstrained scenarios respectively. This special case is interesting since in some scenarios the voters/legislators might not care about how they vote but still might care about the outcomes. However, if pivot considerations are negligible, the preferences over outcomes do not matter for the voting/tendering decision and the situation may be analyzed using the zero-voting-preferences case of the present model.
E¢ ciency
In the absence of any mechanism for buying and selling votes, the outcome of voting will in general be ine¢ cient. There is simply nothing to make legislators take into account the e¤ect of their vote on others. A natural hypothesis is that allowing the lobbyists to compete for the votes will help align the outcome with overall societal values for the alternatives, presuming that the lobbyists'budgets represent the utility of some (possibly unmodeled) agents. Our analysis shows that this is not always so.
Under what circumstances will vote buying result in e¢ ciency? If budgets are binding, then equilibrium will be (approximately) e¢ cient if for some reason the budgets are proportional to the true surpluses of the agents in the society, and the legislators'voting preferences are too. That is, let V X = P i dV i e " , and (2007) . While certain such games could lead to an e¢ cient outcome, it is clear that the set of circumstances in which the outcome would necessarily maximize total societal utility are quite stringent.
Unknown preferences
Our analysis so far has assumed that legislators' voting preferences are known. This seems reasonable in the lobbying scenario. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile exploring the e¤ect of lobbyists'uncertainty over legislators'voting preferences. Consider the up-front vote buying case. Suppose that, for all i, V i is an independent draw from a continuous distribution F . We assume that F has a connected support and a continuous and positive density on its support, and is such that z + F (z)=f (z) and z + (F (z) 1)=f (z) are both increasing on the support of F . There are many prominent distributions satisfying this, such as the uniform distribution. LetV = F 1 (0:5) be the median of the distribution F . In this environment we impose the constraint that parties' o¤ers must in expectation be within their budgets at each point in the game, assuming it ends at that point.
Proposition 4 For any > 0, there is N ( ) and " such that for all N > N ( ) and all grids with " 2 (0; ") the following hold.
If B Y > B X +V N=2 + , then Y wins with probability of at least 1 .
If B X > B Y V N=2 + , then X wins with probability of at least 1 .
The result is almost a complete characterization of equilibria for large N , as the conditions cover budget di¤erences except those that fall in an interval of size 2 .
When is su¢ ciently small, the party who is likely to lose will not enter the bidding and the winning party will bid the minimum necessary to secure majority with su¢ ciently high probability. The reason for the minimum payment in equilibrium is clear. As in all other cases, the loser would like to avoid payment 10 .
Indirect promises
Due to legal or ethical reasons or plainly because the voting is con…dential, it might be the case that lobbyists cannot acquire legislators' votes directly or make payments contingent on how the legislator actually votes. Instead, a lobbyist can in ‡uence the voting only by making promises that will be ful…lled if and only if this lobbyist wins.
To model this, suppose that, in its turn to propose, Lobbyist k promises Legislator i a payment c k i (instead of the bribes p k i ) that will be paid out if k wins, independently of how i voted. Again the process ends if two rounds go by without a change in who would be the winner.
Since the winner must pay all the promises it made, at any point along the process, it has to be that
. This is in contrast with the up-front buying scenario where the payment o¤ered to i counts against k's budget only if i prefers to tender to k. The payo¤ to Lobbyist k is W k P N i=1 c k i if k wins; 0 if k loses (and 1 if the game never ends). Thus, the winner honors its promises to all legislators regardless of how they cast their votes, while the loser is not making any payments.
Since they are not directly paid for their votes, they are assumed to vote according to their voting preferences V In the most compelling interpretation of this scenario, the lobbyist makes the promises to the constituency of legislator i. If, for example, the lobbyist can in ‡uence the structure of the bill being voted upon, the c k i 's could represent "pork" to a given legislator's district. The V k i 's are derived from the preferences of i's constituency over the actual outcomes including the promises (be it because the legislator cares about the constituency's bene…t or because of reelection considerations). To formalize the connection between the promises and legislators' voting preferences, let U k i measure the bene…t to i's con-stituency of Lobbyist k's win. The simplest way to think about it is that all the voters in i's district share the same preferences over the outcomes. We assume that V Other than the above, the game remains essentially as before. It is important to emphasize that the main di¤erence is that here the legislator maintains control of the vote and payments are contingent only on the outcome, whereas in the up front buying scenario considered before payments were contingent on the individual's vote but not on the outcome of the vote.
Let
and relabel legislators so that U i is non-increasing in i. Under this labeling, let m = (N + 1) =2, suppose (w.l.o.g) that U m > 0 and let n = jfi : U i > 0gj. Also assume that for all i and k, the values U i and W k are not multiples of ". Recall that, given a number z, dze " is the smallest multiple of " greater than z, and let U = P n i=m dU i e " > 0 be the minimal sum that Y has to promise to legislators in order to secure the support of a minimal majority, in case X does not promise anything. The analysis is now the same as in the case where voters (legislators) care only about outcomes and not how they cast their vote. This is similar to the model in DJW (2006) where the case of non-binding budgets is considered. Further details of the game and proofs of the subsequent results are not provided here as they follow immediately from DJW (2006). + U .
The idea behind this result is easily explained. Lobbyist Y must spend at least U in order to secure a majority. After that, X could try to obtain some of these votes back (or others, if Y has overspent on these marginal votes), with the competition back and forth leading to the winner being the lobbyist with the largest budget (or willingness to pay) once an expense of U has been incurred by Y . This game has many equilibria because the loser's behavior is not pinned down, as it is certain to lose and will not have to honor the promises it makes. The introduction of uncertainty over the other lobbyist's budget (or value) and of an equilibrium re…nement singles out equilibria where the lobbyists in turn purchase a winning majority in the least expensive way possible, provided that their total commitment does not exceed their budget (or value). The identity of the winner would still be the same as above, but the total payment of the winner would be the smaller of the loser's budget and its value adjusted by the magnitude U . That is, If Y wins then Y promises exactly min B X ; W X " +U and if X wins then X promises exactly max min B Y ; W Y "
U + "; 0 . Moreover, only "near-median" voters, betweenm = fmin i : dU i e " = dU m e " g andn = fmin i : U i > "g, receive positive payments. To sum up, the lobbying competition with indirect promises has the ‡avor of an English Auction. Focusing on the re…ned equilibria of the perturbed game, the winner ends up paying the second highest budget or value (adjusted by a measure of the preference advantage that one has over the other among the legislators). Only the intensity of the preferences of a group of near median legislators a¤ect the outcome and only members of this group get promises in equilibrium. Notice that the signi…cant sum that ends up being paid is in contrast to the minimal sums paid out by the winner in the upfront purchase scenarios.
Further comments on modeling assumptions
Let us comment brie ‡y on some of the simplifying assumptions of this paper. Consider …rst the assumption that o¤ers made to voters at some point in the process cannot be withdrawn at a later point. It is not obvious whether this assumption is more or less realistic than the opposite assumption that allows o¤ers to be withdrawn at the end of each round. However, our assumption is not meant to increase realism but rather to circumvent technical di¢ culties familiar from the "Colonel Blotto" literature. The combination of sequential bidding and irreversible promises simpli…es the analysis and allows us to incorporate into the model heterogeneity of the voters and the lobbyists that would make it very hard or even impossible to analyze in the absence of those assumptions.
We maintain throughout the analysis the assumption that the lobbyists possess complete information regarding each other's valuations and budgets. The extension to incomplete information is far from straightforward. The case in which the lobbyists are not budget constrained is close to simpler models for which we analyzed the case of incomplete information about valuations. Based on those analyses, we conjecture that, with incomplete information about valuations the present model will have a multiplicity of equilibria, among them ones in which the losing lobbyist also ends up paying non-negligible sums.
When the budgets are the main constraint, we do not have any conjectures, since the models whose complete information versions we have analyzed are too di¤erent to allow informed conjectures..
Related literature
The most closely related work is Groseclose and Snyder (1996) that models the lobbying of a legislature by a targeted o¤ers game where each party gets to move only once, and in sequence. A subsequent paper by Banks (2000) modi…es their continuum voters model to one with a …nite number of voters. The conclusions of Propositions 2 and 3 are quite di¤erent from theirs. Their model provides a signi…cant second-mover advantage, which contrasts sharply with the open-ended sequential nature of our game. Speci…cally, in their game, in order to win, the …rst mover needs to be able to bid in such a way that it would be unpro…table for the second mover to buy any majority. In a game without an exogenously determined last mover, as the one we analyze, if one lobbyist is (temporarily) outbid for some legislator, it can remobilize those resources, which places lobbyists on a more equal footing. Also, owing to the single move that each lobbyist has in the Groseclose and Snyder model, the distinction between budgets is and values has no importance in their model, while in our model budgets and values have rather di¤erent e¤ects on the outcome. It is conceivable that in some scenarios a formal procedure indeed creates asymmetry of the sort on which the work of Groseclose and Snyder focuses. However, in many other situations there is no such formal structure and the lobbying process resembles more a continuing bidding process like the one we model. Our analysis shows that this changes signi…cantly the strategic interaction and the results.
Baron (2001) analyzes a game in which two competing lobbyists can make o¤ers to legislators in repeated rounds. His game di¤ers from ours in that he models agenda setting and the legislative game in much more detail (whereas we take two alternatives as …xed), and lobbyists pay to get their alternative proposed in addition to buying votes to get it passed. The agenda setting part of the game enriches the interaction substantially, but also makes it di¢ cult to obtain characterizations of equilibrium. Nevertheless, Baron obtains some interesting results on the pattern of the resulting majority and how it relates to the proposal process. Given the di¤erence in game structure and focus, his work and ours are complementary.
There are also related papers on lobbying that have roots in the common agency literature, such as Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit (1996) , Le Breton and Salanie (2003) , and Martimort and Semenov (2006) , among others.
11 As such models generally look at a single voter (the politician or agent), the complete information solutions result in e¢ cient outcomes (e.g., see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Le Breton and Salanie (2003) ). 12 In particular the politician as well as each lobbyist ends up being pivotal; because some lobbyist is making a payment that is not pivotal in swaying the politician, then they could lower their payment and not a¤ect the outcome. This reinforces the idea that the ine¢ ciencies that we uncovered are due to the fact that in many contexts at least some players end up not being pivotal in a vote buying game when the vote is not by unanimity. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) discuss the rationale for the prohibition of vote buying. They observe that under a unanimity voting rule, free trade in votes would lead to e¢ ciency. They suggest however that this might not be the case when a simple majority rule is in force. They do not model the market for votes formally, but argue intuitively that a perfect market for votes would lead to e¢ ciency, but that imperfections are likely to arise and might preclude e¢ ciency. Our analysis can be seen as providing a particular formal interpretation to these ideas. Neeman (1999) points out that, with some uncertainty over legislators' behavior, pivot considerations are of marginal importance and hence vote buying (by a single buyer) need not result in e¢ ciency.
13 Our own analysis of e¢ ciency focuses on the next step-it inquires about the e¢ ciency consequences of competition between vote buyers.
Appendix
Proposition 1: The vote-buying game with up-front payments has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every equilibrium the same lobbyist wins, and the losing lobbyist never makes any o¤ers.
Proof of Proposition 1: The facts that the budget-constrained vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies follows from the fact that this is a …nite game of perfect information, and hence we can …nd such an equilibrium via backwards induction. The fact that in every equilibrium the same lobbyist wins, also follows from a backward induction argument. Each terminal node has a unique winner (as the V i 's are not a multiple of " and so legislators are never indi¤erent), and lobbyists prefer to win regardless of the payments necessary. Thus, in any subgame, working by induction back from nodes whose successors are only terminal nodes, there is a unique winner. It then follows directly that the losing lobbyist never makes any o¤ers, as they could otherwise deviate to o¤er nothing and guarantee no payment.
In the unconstrained game each period the o¤er to each legislator has to weakly increase, and it must strictly increase for at least one i. Therefore, after lN periods the minimal o¤er made to some legislator is (l + 1) ", and eventually is greater than max k W k .
An o¤er greater than W k is made only if k is certain that j 6 = k will outbid k, but in equilibrium it cannot be that both X and Y are certain they will be outbid by the other. So in equilibrium both players quit in every period after some …nite period, and hence the equilibrium is the same as if the game were truncated at any such period. Having reduced the game to a …nite game we can complete argument as in the constrained case above. Proposition 2: If the budgets are large enough so that (2) and (3) are satis…ed, then, if is small enough, X wins if
and Y wins if
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the following result assuming = 0.
Lobbyist X has a strategy that guarantees winning at cost bounded by
and lobbyist Y has a strategy that guarantees winning at cost bounded by
This immediately implies Proposition 2 because then for small enough when the inequalities are strictly satis…ed the same strategies guarantee a win within the budget constraint. Lobbyist X can guarantee a win using the strategy we describe next. Have X allocate o¤ers as follows. Let t be the period. X will identify a set of legislators S t to " buy"that has cardinality exactly m. X will make the minimal necessary o¤ers to buy these votes.
To complete the proof we need only describe how X should select S t , and then show that if X has followed this strategy in past periods, then X will have enough budget to cover the required payments regardless of the strategy of Y .
Let p Y i be the current o¤er that Y has to legislator i. Set this to 0 in the case where Y has never made a viable o¤er to the legislator, or in a case where X already has the best standing o¤er to the legislator. Similarly de…ne p X i . X selects to whom to make o¤ers by looking for a set that minimizes the sum of what X has to o¤er in order to beat Y , plus the o¤ers of Y that X thereby frees up. In particular, let S t be the set of m legislators that minimizes
. This is equivalent to choosing the m legislators that have the smallest values of
In the case where there are some i's that are tied under the above criterion, let X lexicographically favor legislators with lower indices. To complete the proof, we simply need to show that this strategy is within X's budget in every possible situation, presuming that X has followed this strategy up to time t.
Notice that the cost of a legislator i 2 S t to X is at most
The expression maxf p Y i V i " ; 0g captures the fact that it could be that p Y i < V i in which case no o¤er is necessary.
The amount that must be o¤ered to a legislator can only rise or stay constant over time, and so if some legislators were "purchased" by X in the past and have not been subsequently purchased by Y , then these legislators are still among the cheapest m available in the current period time and would still be selected under X's strategy (including the lexicographic tie-breaking).
Let i denote the most "expensive" i 2 S t in terms of the "adjusted price" p
. If there are several such legislators, pick the one with the lowest index. So, i 2 arg max i2St p
, and let S t be the union of fi g with the complement of S t . Given the algorithm followed by X, we know that
for every i 2 S t . This can be rewritten as
for each i 2 S t . Equations (7) and (8) imply that the amount required by X to follow this strategy at this stage is at most
If we can get an upper bound on the expression p
, then we have an upper bound on how much X has to pay. So we want to maximize p
subject to the following constraints: 
for each i 2 S t , where
From (9), for X's strategy to be feasible it is su¢ cient that
Substituting for x Y from (10), this becomes
which has an upper bound when i = N , and which then yields the claimed expressions by substituting the de…nition of B Y .
is not a multiple of ". If X o¤ers only bzc " dV i e " to those legislators then X would have left over an amount d. Therefore to d=" of these legislators X could o¤er " more, i.e., dze " dV i e " , without exceeding his value of winning. Then the minimal cost to Y to obtain a majority would be exactly . Consider any node at which k must o¤er an additional amount that is more than W k to obtain a majority. At such a node k will make such an o¤er only if both lobbyists are certain j 6 = k will overbid, which j will do only if both are certain j will win, in which case k looses > 0 by making the o¤er instead of quitting. So at any node where k must o¤er at least W k to obtain a majority, k will quit. Now assume w.l.o.g. that W k "
< bW j c " . We argue by induction that, at any node where k must spend a strictly positive amount to obtain a majority, k will quit. Assume the inductive hypothesis that k will quit at any node where the minimal o¤er needed to obtain a majority is W k l". Consider a node at which k must spend W k (l + 1) ". If k makes such an o¤er, leading to node , consider a response of j of mirroring k's last bid and adding " to m of the o¤ers, leading to node 0 at which the minimal required for k to obtain a majority becomes W k l" and hence k will quit at 0 . Thus at the continuation equilibrium must be one at which j wins, and hence k's o¤er at leads to an additional loss to k of at least . Hence k would prefer to quit at . Thus we have the following.
above, Y must spend more than W Y "
to obtain a majority after such an initial move by X and would prefer to quit. (The amount that X must spend to win will typically be less than W X ; we do not specify the exact amount as it is even more notationally cumbersome and not of great interest.) If Y moves …rst then after making an o¤er of V and thereby obtaining a majority we are in case 2 above. On the other hand if is less than W Y then, whatever X does in the …rst move (so long as it is at a cost under W X ), Y can subsequently obtain a majority at a cost under W Y whereupon X will need to spend a positive amount to obtain a majority while W Y > W X . Hence X will quit at this point, so that at any equilibrium X will not make any initial o¤er when W
Y "
> .
This complete the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that V X satis…es (2) in the place of B X , and V Y satis…es (3) in the place of B Y . In the large budget case, lobbyist X wins in the donations-based vote-buying game if
The proof of Proposition 5 is also straightforward and is again omitted, noting simply that the above equations follow from (4), (5) and a maximum willingness to donate of V i , and that
Proposition 4: For any > 0, there is N ( ) and " such that for all N > N ( ) and all grids with " 2 (0; ") the following hold.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Lemma 1 Suppose that Party Y o¤ers a constant price x to all voters, such that 1 > F (x) > 0. The least expensive way for Party X to assure itself an expected share 2 [0; 1] of the vote would be o¤ering a constant price to all voters. The same is also true if the roles are reversed.
Note that we do not assume here that the constant price o¤ered by X is a multiple of ". If that constraint were added, then the cost to X of obtaining a share would be at least as high (and might involve a di¤erent strategy).
Proof of Lemma 1: The problem of …nding bids p Thus we have shown that any solution to (11) necessarily has identical prices o¤ered to all agents.
The proof for Lemma 1 with the roles reversed for the parties has (11) with corresponding …rst order conditions
Working through similar cases as those above, and this time using the fact that z + F (z)=f (z) is increasing on the support of F , yields the same conclusion.
Lemma 2 then X can obtain a share of (0:5 + ) at each stage.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We show the …rst claim, as the second is analogous. Suppose that it is Y 's turn. If Y can o¤er all voters the same price p = B X =(0:5 )N + F 1 (0:5 ), then Y can win in one step. This is so since, by the previous claim, X's least expensive way of getting at least (0:5 )N is by o¤ering the same price to all voters. A constant price that su¢ ces here is B X =(0:5 )N which exactly exhausts X's budget (ignoring the constraint that X must make o¤ers in multiples of ", and more than exhausts it if the constraint is taken into account). Now, since B the price p 0 is feasible. Clearly, if p 0 is not a multiple of " then for any " small enough there is a p 00 that is slightly larger that also gives Y an expected majority of (0:5 + )N , and for a small enough grid size still more than exhausts X's budget. We now show (1) and (2) of the proposition. We concentrate on (1), as the other case is analogous, given the lemmas above. obtain an expected share of (0:5 + ). When N is made su¢ ciently large (here we mean that B X and B Y increase proportionately with N ), an expected share of (0:5 + ) means
